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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
In the Matter of the Adoption
of

GENE DEVERAUX,
A Minor.
In the Matter of the Adoption

APPELLEES'
BRIEF

of

DIANE DEVERAUX,
A Minor.

STATEMENT
The proceedings relating to the adoption of Diane
Deveraux and Gene Deveraux, respectively, have been
consolidated by order of this Court.
Except for minor differences as to the nature, condition and reaction of each of said children, the facts in the
two cases are the same.
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THE FACTS
Deprivation of Custody

By decree made and entered on August 31, 1950, (Tr.
246) , the Juvenile Court of the Third Judicial District in
and for Utah County determined that Ellis Deveraux and
Rhea Walker Deveraux (now Rhea Walker Brown, the appellant herein) are unfit and improper persons to have the
care, custody and control of their children. The body of said
decree is as follows :
"IT IS THEREFORE ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court that Ellis Deveraux and Rhea
Walker Deveraux, the parents, of said children be
and they are hereby deprived of the custody of said
children.
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, by the Court
that said Larry, Blaine, Gene, and Dianne Deveraux
Walker Deveraux, the parents, of said children be
dependent, neglected, children within the meaning of
the laws of Utah, in such cases made and provided,
and that subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the
Court, the said : children be committed to the Utah
State Department of Public Welfare for foster home
care, treatment, and supervision. And it is further
ordered by the Court that the father, Ellis Deveraux
pay $100.00 per month for their support and maintenance" (Tr. 54, 246).
Pursuant to said decree, the children were placed by
the Utah State Department of Public Welfare in the home
of Mr. and Mrs. Lindberg (Tr. 134, 197, ~13) and later
were moved to other foster homes (Tr. 133, 139-140, 198,
199).
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On January 17, 1951, Gene was placed in the home of
Clyde D. Sandgren and Zola M. Sandgren (Tr. 57), and
Diane was placed in the home of Ray Cole Stickney and
Dona Merl Stickney on February 6, 1951 (Tr. 139-140).
Ever since those dates, said children have been and now
are in the custody of said foster parents (the respective
appellees) (Tr. 40, 48, 57, 60).

Adoption Proceedings
After the children had been in their homes for more
than one year, appellees petitioned the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, in separate proceedings,
for the adoption of said children, relying upon the provisions
of Section 78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which eliminates the necessity of obtaining the consent "from a father
or mother who has been judicially deprived of the custody
of the child on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion."

.. .
_

....

~

~~

---

After the decrees of adoption had been entered (Gene,
Tr. 4-5; Diane, Tr. 6-7), appellant's attorney was permitted .
an ex parte examination of the sealed files and appellant
filed in said District Court complaints seeking writs of
habeas corpus and custody of said children (Tr. 69, 126)
upon the ground that she had not received notice of the
adoption proceedings and had not consented to such adoptions.
In view of the fact that appellant had, by said ex parte
examination of the sealed files, obtained full information as
to the whereabouts of the children, appellees had no objection to having the District Court set aside the adoption de-
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crees, and hear the adoption matters on notice to the natural.parents. Therefore, while the habeas corpus proceedings were pending, formal notice was given to the natural
parents and the hearings were held on February 4, 1953.
At that time the decrees of adoption theretofore entered
were vacated (Tr. 31), testimony was offered by appellees
in support of their petitions (Tr. 39-52, 56-62), the natural
father of the children consented in writing to the adoption
of each child (Tr. 35-6, 55-6), and appellant stipulated that
appellees are fit and proper persons to adopt the respective
children (Tr. 44, 56).
Before any testimony was taken, appellant filed written
motions to dismiss the petitions (Gene, Tr. 6; Diane, Tr.
8) upon the following grounds:
( 1) Another action was pending; (2) the Juvenile
Court had exclusive jurisdiction; (3) appellant never consented to the adoptions; and ( 4) the children were never
placed in a children's aid society pursuant to Section 5510-40, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and the adoptions were
never authorized by the Juvenile Court pursuant to Section
55-10-43, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
After the taking of some testimony, appellant made
oral motions. In the case of Diane, said motion was based
upon the grounds that neither the natural mother nor the
Juvenile Court had consented to the adoption and that there·
had been no permanent deprivation of custody by the J uvenile Court (Tr. 52). In the case of Gene, the motion was
founded upon the contentions that no consent to the adoption had been given by the natural mother or the Juvenile
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Court, and that the latter court still had jurisdiction in the
matter (Tr. 62). The court denied appellant's motions
(Tr. 63).

H~

ti~-:3

byil£;:

otiun 11

PERTINENT TESTIMONY
Upon the hearings on the adoption petitions, unrefuted testimony was introduced as follows :

Re: Appellant
After the natural parents were deprived of
custody by the Juvenile· Court, they were divorced
(Tr. 64). Said divorce was obtained January 9,
1951 (Tr. 65).
Natural mother (appellant) had sexual relations
with Henry Brown prior to divorce from natural
father of G~ne and Diane (Tr. 75).
Appellant started living with Brown, as his
wife, in April, 1951 (Tr. 73), which was four months
after the interlocutory decree of divorce was
granted.
Appellant's sole reasons for wanting the children returned to her were that ( 1) she would like to
have her family together, (2) the two older boys
asked about Gene and Diane, and ( 3) she could
now take care of them (Tr. 87).
Henry Brown is not acquainted with the subject children and they don't know him (Tr. 93,
97-8) . His interest in them was a mild interest
(Tr. 202). At the time he made a payment to the
Welfare Department for the care of appellant's four
children, he indicated that his reason for doing so
was that "he might as well be paying his money to
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the Welfare Department, because if he didn't he'd
have to pay it to the Government in income taxes"
(Tr. 202).
Prior to commencement of the adoption proceedings, appellant made only inquiries about the
children, but took no steps to regain their custody
(Tr. 100).
n(~:

(1)

Condition of Children

At time of placement with appellees:

At the time the children were placed with appellees, they were both suffering from malnutrition,
were pale, bore forlorn and almost hostile expressions (Tr. 132), and were in need of much love and
care (Tr. 198).
Diane was very small (Tr. 132, 140, 166, 168,
194), undernourished (Tr. 40), in poor health (Tr.
195), anemic (Tr. 214), had rickets (Tr. 40), craved
affection (Tr. 216), lacked security (Tr. 194), had
dull hair and eyes (Tr. 140, 194), was knock-kneed
or pigeon toed (Tr. 40, 148, 164, 194), appeared to
be unhappy (Tr. 140, 162, 194), was exceptionally
timid or frightened (Tr. 40, 132, 141, 148, 164, 166,
168), was afraid of other children (Tr. 195), and
had no religious training (Tr. 76).
Gene was very thin (Tr. 152, 188, 190), pale
(Tr. 180), undernourished (Tr. 180), neurotic (Tr.
211), wet the bed regularly (Tr. 222-3), seemed to
be lost and unwanted (Tr. 190), appeared to be
timid or frightened (Tr. 132, 152, 155, 171, 178),
lacked security (Tr. 178, 216), craved affection (Tr.
216), was resentful, suspicious and on the defensive
(Tr. 146, 171, 172), was disobedient (Tr. 223),
difficult to manage (Tr. 152, 172, 181, 187, 190,
199, 216), indulged in temper tantrums (Tr. 140),
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was frustrated (Tr. 177), anti-social (Tr. 177, 199),
refused to participate with others (Tr. 152), resented adult authority (Tr. 177), used bad language
(Tr. 223), was cruel to small children (Tr. 207),
and had no religious training (Tr. 76).
(2)

I'.

,.:::..--··

:iJ:

J!!$l'
~~.~

r~1

After care by appellees:

Since receiving the love and care of appellees,
the general physical condition of both children has
improved (Tr. 135, 216-17), and they appear to be
happier and more secure (Tr. 135).
Diane is now happy (Tr. 136, 148), her legs are
becoming straight (Tr. 41, 149, 164), her color is
much better (Tr. 217), she has filled out (Tr. 164,
166), her hair is nice (Tr. 41, 165), she acts like a
normal child (Tr. 165), she is no longer afraid of
people (Tr. 141, 162, 166, 168, 195), is more secure
(Tr. 217), her general health and attitudes are very
good (Tr. 195-6), and she has received religious
training (Tr. 42, 43, 141, 148, 162).
Gene is now happier (Tr. 143, 186), maturing
normally (Tr. 178), has shown a marked improvement in physical condition (Tr. 181, 184, 188), is
well-nourished and doesn't catch cold as readily (Tr.
184), has become friendly and has greater trust in
people (Tr. 136, 172), exhibits good deportment (Tr.
216-17), is cooperative (Tr. 178, 181), has become
well-mannered (Tr. 143, 153, 155, 188), enjoys improved social relationships (Tr.172, 178,181, 190),
he no longer wets the bed ( Tr. 223) , or is mean to
other children ( Tr. 143, 178) , and he has/ received
religious training (Tr. 152, 155, 171).

~:::

Re: Care of Children
(1)

Neglect by Appellant:

Appellant's neglect of and lack of interest in the childrent is shown not only by the Juvenile Court's decree de-
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priving her of custody but also by the confidential reports
of the State Department of Public Welfare filed in the respective adoption proceedings and referred to at page 242
of the Transcript. Those reports show the following:

"* • • the following behavior may indicate a lack
of genuine interest in the children:
" 'Rhea Walker Deveraux was referred to the
Juvenile Court on February 14, 1945, for contributing to the neglect of her children, at which time she
served forty days in the Utah County Jail. She was
again referred on July 2, 1945, for contributing to
the neglect of her children and was ordered by the
Court to serve eighty days in the Utah County Jail.
When the father, who had been in the service, returned the children were allowed to go back into
the home.'
"On August 29, 1950, a petition was filed alleging: '* * * that the mother conducts herself
in a very unladylike manner; that the parents still
persist in neglecting their children, to-wit: that they
frequent beer parlors and are continuously intoxicated in the presence of said children. That said
mother keeps company with men not her husband,
and leaves her children alone and unattended for
long periods of time, to-wit: that on or about the
2nd day of August, 1950 said mother left her children and did not return until about the 9th day of
August'."
(2)

Care by Appellees:

On the other hand, the Transcript is replete with testimony concerning appellees' love and care of the children.
Special attention is directed to the manner in which the

/
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children have been welcomed into and become a part of the
homes and families of appellees, as evidenced by the following testimony :
Diane is a close companion to the adoptive parents-appellees and their world "revolves around her"
(Tr. 41); they love and provide good care and attention for her (Tr. 49, 141, 149)-just as much as
though she were their natural child (Tr. 166, 168);
their respective families have accepted Diane as
fully as the others in said families (Tr. 196) ; and
she is living a full and normal life with them (Tr.
149).

•.:._":

t_

_

.:

There is a very close family companionship and
love between Gene, on the one hand, and the adoptive parents-appellees and their other children, on
the other (Tr. 143-4, 189, 191) -particularly between Gene and his adoptive father (Tr. 144) ; the
entire family has accepted him in a normal parentchild and brother-sister relationship and this is reciprocated on his part (Tr. 61, 153, 178, 181, 182,
188, 191) ; Gene is treated in the same manner as
the other children in the family ( Tr. l53, 182, 189 ;
the adoptive parents-appellees act like they "love"
and "worship" Gene (Tr. 153) so that he now "feels
like he belongs" (Tr. 191) ·; and they have given him
"very constructive training" (Tr. 183).
Re: Consequences of Taking Children from Appellees
Several witnesses testified as to the probable result
to the children if they were now to be taken away from
appellees:
Dr. Walter T. ~asler (who was identified in
appellant's brief as a specialist (Br. 7) but who also
engages in general practicie (Tr. 180)) expressed
fear that Gene, who had now "grown into a happy
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youngster," would be "under great disappointment"
if he were taken from his adoptive parents (Tr.
185) and that it would "break down his morale" and
be "disastrous" ( Tr. 185) and "break down his ambitions and desires for the future" (Tr. 184).
Mrs. Eloise Morley, a social worker in the
State Department of Public Welfare, is of the opinion that both children would develop fears, insecurities and inability to know where they belong, which
would produce conflicts, hostilities and unwholesome behavior, and as a result they would be unhappy children (Tr. 201). She was also apprehensive that appellant's "home is filled with conflicts and uncertainties. It couldn't be predicted at
all that it would be a stable, well adjusted home
situation" (Tr. 207).
Mrs. Elsa V. Harris, Child Welfare Supervisor for the Department of Public Welfare for Utah
County, testified that it is "a delicate operation" to
move a child, that each such move "is a traumatic or
wounding experience * * * In other words
every time you move a child there is regression. You
have to start all over again. It's a pretty painful
process for both the child and the foster parents
you place the child with, because they have to take
all the child comes to the home with, his hostility,
his need for affection. * * * And if you move
a child from that situation into another one you are
taking it as if you would from its own parents, and
it is an operation that can be quite drastic" (Tr.
219-20).
Mark K. Allen, a teacher of and consultant in
psychology having BA and MA degrees, having completed the residence requirements for a PhD. and
having broad experience in that field, testified that
it is "always traumatic to remove the child and require him to make adjustments to new situations,
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where there is a question about whether the child
would have an equal amount of emotional security
* * * If it interprets it as a place of securitywhere it gets affection, where it feels wanted, and
feels loved and accepted- certainly you would want
to be very careful about uprooting that and shifting
to a situation where that security might not be
thoroughly guaranteed, judging by the previous history" (Tr. 229-30), and that "I think the fundamental psychological consideration on this kind of a problem is the matching up of emotional needs of children with parents, and if a child needs the affection
that parents need to give to a child I think that is a
very wholesome situation. In setting the one situation over against the other that would be the main
consideration, in my judgment, to demonstrate clearly the genuine emotional needs of parents to have
the child and of the child to have those parents. In
my experience with people who choose to adopt children they usually have a genuine emotional need to
have those children. Otherwise they wouldn't request them. That can't always be guaranteed with
the natural parents. I believe, from the facts stated,
that it looks quite clear that the emotional need of
these parents for the child and the child for the parents is real in the present situation, and that this
child probably has perceived these foster parents
as fulfilling his needs in a way that has been constructive in his development, and that it probably
would be a psychological risk to destroy that relationship at his age" (Tr. 231-32).
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I.

§i;

iaJf

wat

THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THESE

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
PROCEEDINGS AND THE RIGHT TO PRO·
CEED UNDER THAT JURISDICTION.
POINT II.
THE CONSENT OF THE NATURAL MOTHER
WAS NOT NECESSARY TO VALID ADOPTIONS BECAUSE SHE HAD BEEN JUDICIALLY DEPRIVED OF THE CUSTODY OF THE
CHILDREN BY THE JUVENILE COURT ON
ACCOUNT OF NEGLECT.

POINT III.
·THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DECREED THESE ADOPTIONS WITHOUT. THE
CONSENT OF THE NATURAL MOTHER BY
VIRTUE OF HER HAVING BEEN JUDICIALLY DEPRIVED OF THEIR CUSTODY BY THE
JUVENILE COURT.

POINT IV.
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS REQUIRED TO
CONSIDER AND MAKE FINDINGS AS TO
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN.

POINT V.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
ADMIT IN EVIDENCE THE FINDINGS OF
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FACT. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE
AND JUDGMENT OF THE JUVENILE COURT
DATED FEBRUARY 13, 1953, IN THE MATTER OF LARRY AND BLAINE DEVERAUX.

POINT VI.

··-' ..
'!!,.,_

:"l"'·1·
.
.~._

·::r
, ..

: OF

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO ADMIT IN EVIDENCE THE WRITTEN
REPORT OF THE TOOELE COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENT.

POINT VII.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

POINT VIII.
THE BEST, INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN
REQUIRE THEIR ADOPTIONS BY THE APPELLEES.
ARGUMENT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In answering appellant's brief we point out initially
that in her statement of facts she has not set forth the full
judgment of the Juvenile Court but appears to have studiously avoided in that statement, as well as in the remainder of her brief, any reference to the most significant
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part (the real kernel) of that judgment insofar as this appeal is concerned. That provision is as follows :
"IT IS THEREFORE ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that Ellis Deveraux and Rhea
Walker Deveraux, the parents of said children be
and they are hereby deprived of the custody of said
children."
We also desire to correct the misstatements in her brief
"that throughout the period of time from when the children
were taken from their natural parents appellant, pursuant
to the Juvenile Court decree, made payments for their support" (p. 3), and that "In fact she paid for their support
pursuant to the Juvenile Court decree" (p. 28). Reference
to the decree of the Juvenile Court (Ex. A, Tr. 54, 246) will
show that ( 1) there was no obligation imposed upon the
appellant to make any payments for the support of the
children, but the obligation was imposed upon the father,
and (2) while the decree of the Juvenile Court was rendered August 31, 1950, no payment was made by the appellant until January, 1951, and thereafter only three payments of $100.00, $60.00 and $60.00, respectively, were
made.
For the convenience of the Court we set forth in the
Appendix (infra pp. ii-vii) the applicable statutes.
POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THESE
PROCEEDINGS AND THE RIGHT TO PROCEED UNDER THAT JURISDICTION.
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., ..

(a) Jurisdiction

...:

.........

Article VIII, Section 7, of the Constitution of the State
of Utah provides that "The District Court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted
in this Constitution, and not prohibited by law; * * *"
This provision is carried verbatim into the Judicial Code
of this state under the provisions of Section 78-3-4, U. C.
A. 1953.

--......._

...... ::.:

District Courts of this state, therefore, are constitutional courts having general jurisdiction in all matters civil
and criminal not excepted by the Constitution or prohibited
by the laws of the State. Kramer v. Pixton, 72 U. 1, 268
P. 1029; Baker v. Department of Registration, 78 U. 424,
3 P. (2d) 1082.
This Court early decided that this jurisdiction "covers
about everything of a civil or criminal nature not expressly
committed to another tribunal." People v. House, 4 U. 369,
380, 10 P. 838. And in determining jurisdiction of the District Court, the test is not whether the court has jurisdiction
of a particular case, but rather whether the court has jurisdiction of the class of cases to which the particular case
belongs. Kramer v. Pixton, supra.

--.... -

:;:::

?f

Under the above provisions and decisions it is clear that
original jurisdiction in adoption matters has been committed to the District Courts of this state and that no such jurisdiction (concurrent or otherwise) has been expressly or by
implication committed to any other court.

Section 78-30-7 U. C. A. sets forth the specific jurisdiction of the District Court in adoption proceedings and the
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method by which such jurisdiction may be properly invoked
in any case. It provides that "Adoption proceedings shall
'be commenced by filing in duplicate a petition with the clerk
of the district court of the county where the person adopting resides • • *"
The record shows that the provisions of Section 7880-7 were literally and fully complied with in each of the

subject cases and thus the court below obtained jurisdiction
in these proceedings, unless, as pointed out in People v.
House, supra, jurisdiction is "expressly committed to another tribunal."
Appellant does not point out wherein jurisdiction in
adoption matters has been under any circumstances expressly committed to another tribunal but appears to contend that the District Court did not have jurisdiction because the Juvenile Court had exclusive jurisdiction of the
care, custody and control of the minor children. This contention appears to be premised largely upon the decisions of
this Court in Jensen v. Sevy, 103 U. 220, 134 P. (2d) 1081,
and Chatwin v. Terry, 107 U. 340, 153 P. (2d) 941, which
we shall endeavor to demonstrate do not support it.
In the first place, after reading and rereading many
times the decision in Jensen v. Sevy, we find no place wherein it is said, as in appellant's brief, that the Juvenile Court
had "exclusive jurisdiction of the care, custody and control
of minor children" and for that reason the District Court
had no jurisdiction in that case.
It will be observed that in the Sevy case under the main
decision of Justice Larson, it was not held that the District
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~~~

Court had no jurisdiction to proceed in the habeas corpus
~' action brought in that court by the father but it was held
titil.:.ne~ that the lower court "was charged with the duty of de;t.~- termining not merely the custody of a juvenile, based upon .
questions of its welfare but also the question of the legality of its restraint or detention" and that "This latter duty
·lf ~1:'11
it could not refer or certify to the Juvenile Court." In
bt~:·
passing on this last question,. this court said, p. 1087:

-~

,Jilt]!$

-~

"The District Court concluded that since petitioner admitted he had not made a showing to the
Juvenile Court as provided in its order, he was not
entitled to custody under the order of the Juvenile
Court; and since the order itself was valid, he was
not entitled to custody in derogation of it. It held
therefore that the detention of the child by its grandparents was lawful and under valid legal process."

If, therefore, as argued by appellant, the decision in
Jensen v. Sevy was to the effect that the District Court had
no jurisdiction and was without power to issue a writ of
JJ: ::t !S: habeas corpus, since jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court was
: :t:l·
exclusive, how then could the District Court hold that the
~. ll ~i: detention of the child by the grandparents was lawful?
~ ~: The answer, of ·course, is obvious. The District Court did
~' have jurisdiction, as this Court held. Similarly, the Disr:w~i! trict Court had jurisdiction to decree the adoptions in the
Jr:,i; · instant cases.

cp;:i:
:~~-:::.

der~e~

Considering the Jensen v. Sevy case further, suppose
that the father had made his showing before the Juvenile
Court and that Court had awarded him the children but
the grandparents had retained custody and had refused to

the J)istr'
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let the father have the child. Could it then also be contended
that the District Court would have no jurisdiction in a
habeas corpus proceeding? The answer is implicit in the
above quotation for if in the one case the father was not
entitled to custody of the child in derogation of the order
of the Juvenile Court, in the other case he would, by the
same reasoning, be entitled to custody in conformity with
an order of the Juvenile Court awarding him custody.
As mentioned above, this court did not hold in the Sevy
case that the Juvenile Court had exclusive jurisdiction of
the care, custody and control of minor children but in the
concurring opinions of Justice Wolfe and Judge Hoyt it
was pointed out that the Juvenile Court has in the words
of the statute itself (Sec. 55-10-5) "exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases relating to the neglect, dependency and
delinquency of children * * *" (Emphasis supplied).
'

The Juvenile Courts of this state are statutory courts,
established pursuant to Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution of the state and were created in 1905 for a special
purpose with special and limited jurisdiction. Salt Lake
County v. Salt Lake City, 42 U. 548. This jurisdiction is
derived from Section 55-10-5 U. C. A. 1953 and its antecedents and is limited to cases relating to the neglect, dependency and delinquency of children. In re Olson, 180 P.
(2d) 210; Jensen v. Sevy, supra, Chatwin v. Terry, supra.
When jurisdiction shall have been acquired by the court
in the case (neglect, dependency or delinquency) of any
child, such child shall continue for the purposes of such
case (neglect, dependency or delinquency) under the
jurisdiction of the court until the child becomes 21 years
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:~:~ of age, etc.- The Juvenile Court may also have jurisdiction
:~,l· in a case relating to the custody of neglected, dependent
and delinquent children. But these adoption cases were not,
::~~ at the time, cases relating to the negh.:ct, dependency and
·-,
,.-' delinquency of the two children involved and the custody
-- of the children was not in question or dispute except as it
.._
--- may have been incidental to the determination of the adop: ::::: tions, Cf. In re Olson, supra, nor could it have been under
..:::: the Sevey case, because each one of the Appellees had
custody over the respective children under and by virtue of
the express provisions of the decree of the Juvenile Court
·- ·::.;::- and not in derogation thereof. Cf. Jensen v. Sevy, supra.
'~

.....

"':..."'

·-~

If the above were insufficient to establish the j urisdiction of the District Court in these cases, Section 55-10-5
U. C. A. and its predecessors establish that jurisdiction
by retaining in subsection (4) thereof jurisdiction in "other
courts of the right to determine the custody of children
upon writs of habeas corpus, or when such custody is incidental to the determination of causes in such courts" (Em=~~:
. ,,- phasis supplied).
~;"'\

:::-.:::.~·

The custody of a child is incidental to the determination
_ - of adoption. Consequently, the lower court, under the ex:::~ press terms of the statute referred to, unquestionably had
- ·-. complete jurisdiction over the subject matter of these pro·.,..,_~ ceedings.
(b) Right to Proceed
Jurisdiction of the District Court having been properly
r£ c. invoked as above shown, the next question (and we believe
der
the only real question involved in these appeals) is whether
111
21 f;
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that court had the right to proceed to decree the adoptions.
Cf. State v. Telford, 93 U. 228, 72 P. (2d) 626.

Section 78-90-8 U. C. A., 1953, infra, provides as to
procedure in adoption cases, as follows:
1. The persons adopting the children and the
children adopted and the other persons whose con.
sent is necessary must appear before the court, and

2. The necessary consent must thereupon be
signed (by the person whose consent is necessary),
and
·
3. An agreement be executed by the persons
adopting to the effect that the children shall be
adopted and treated in all respects as their own lawful children.
Have these procedural requirements been met?
The record shows that each of the petitioners adopting
the children appeared before the court and signed in open
court the agreements required by Section 78-30-8 U. C. A.
(Tr. 47, 51-52, 58, 62). The record also shows that the
children adopted were before the court (Tr. 63). The father
of the children was before the court and, although not required to do so, executed his consent to the adoption of both
children (Tr. 35-36, 55-56). The mother of the children,
the protestant and appellant herein, was also before the
court (Diane, Tr. 11-16, Gene, Tr. 9-14) but never signed
or gave any consent for the adoption of the children.
Thus it will readily appear that all of the named procedural requirements of Section 78-30-8 U. C. A. were com·
plied with except possibly the obtaining of the written con·
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sent of the mother but, as we shall hereinafter show, that
consent was not required for the reason that Section 7890-8 requires the consent of only those persons "whose consent is necessary" (Emphasis supplied).

- ... -

...

POINT II.
THE CONSENT OF THE NATURAL MOTHER
WAS NOT NECESSARY TO VALID ADOPTIONS BECAUSE SHE HAD BEEN JUDICIALLY DEPRIVED OF THE CUSTODY OF THE
CHILDREN BY THE JUVENILE COURT ON
ACCOUNT OF NEGLECT.
We have shown above that the District Court had
jurisdiction of these adoption proceedings and that each
of the procedural requirements has been met. However,
no consent of the natural mother has been signed or given
to the adoptions. This leaves only the question whether
the District Court, under the evidence presented and in
the absence of consent upon the part of the natural mother,
can decree the adoptions. This question, while sometimes
loosely referred to as such, we submit, is not a question of
jurisdiction but one of proof and a consideration of whether,
under the evidence, the lower court could decree the adoptions.
On the 31st day of August, 1950, the Juvenile Court
made and entered its decree and judgment wherein it was
adjudged that the natural parents, Ellis Deveraux and Rhea
Walker Deveraux (Rhea Walker Brown, Appellant), are
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r
i

unfit and improper persons to have the care, custody, control and guardianship of the said Gene and Diane Deveraux,
as well as two other children not herein involved, and
decree was entered as follows :
"IT IS THEREFORE ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court that Ellis Deveraux and Rhea
Walker Deveraux, the parents, of said children be
and they are hereby deprived of the custody of
said children.
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, by the Court
that said Larry, Blaine, Gene and Dianne Deveraux
be and they are hereby declared and adjudged to be
dependent, neglected, children within the meaning.
of the laws of Utah, in such cases made and provided, and that subject to the continuing jurisdiction
of the Court, the said : children be committed to the
Utah State Department of Public Welfare for foster
home care, treatment, and supervision. And it is
further ordered by the Court that the father, Ellis
Deveraux pay $100.00 per month for their support
and maintenance" (Tr. 54, 246).

It is the appellees' contention that the above judgment
of the Juvenile Court "judicially deprived" the natural parents of the custody of the children involved "on account of
* * * neglect * * *" within the clear language and
comprehension of Section 78-30-4 U. C. A., infra, the applicable part of which reads as follows: "except that consent
is not necessary from a father or mother who has been
judicially deprived of the custody of the child on account '
of cruelty, neglect or desertion;" and that consequently
the consent of the appellant was not necessary to the adoptions herein.
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Appellant contends, however, that there can be but
one meaning to the words "judicially deprived of the
custody of the child on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion" and that is "that the parent has been permanently and absolutely deprived of the custody of the child"
and she further contends that "the decree of the Juvenile
Court clearly indicates that this is not the case as it provides
for continuing jurisdiction and that the father of the children shall furnish support therefor" (emphasis supplied).
She contends also that the statutes covering juvenile courts
indicate that proceedings of the nature of the one presented
here do not contemplate the permanent or absolute divesting of the custody of a minor child from its parents and
seems to infer therefrom that one cannot adopt a child
who has been theretofore brought before the Juvenile Court,
in any case without the consent of its parents. Appellant
argues, however, that "unless the natural mother has been
permanently deprived of the custody of her children her
written consent was required before a valid adoption could
be made" (Br. 21), and "The District Court would not
have jurisdiction of an adoption proceeding unless the
consent of the parents is given, or is not necessary" (Br.
23).
Perhaps our perception is not sufficiently broad to conceive of every way in which a parent may be "judicially
deprived of the custody of a child," but we know of only
two ways under the statutes and laws of Utah by which
this can be done and they are ( 1) by the Juvenile Court
in the manner in which it was done in the instant cases, and
(2) by the District Court in divorce proceedings.
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If the argument of appellant, that the statutes do not
contemplate the permanent or absolute divesting of the
custody of minor children because of Section 55-10-5 (3)
U. C. A., which continues jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court
over the child, is followed to its logical conclusion, then that
portion of Section 78-30-1,. U. C. A. reading "except that
consent is not necessary from a father or mother who has
been judicially deprived of the custody of the child on
account of cruelty, neglect or desertion" is a mere nullity
and cannot be applied in any situation and the legislature
has done a futile act.

Of course, this cannot be the case for, in the first
place, as this Court in Chatwin v. Terry, supra, in stating
the well-known rule of statutory construction and in construing the provisions of Section 14-7-4 Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which is now Section 55-10-5 of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, said (p. 942) :
"In construing statutes such as here it is the
duty of this court to give meaning to each and to
reconcile them in such a manner so as to carry out
the reasonable and practical intention of the Legi~
lature."
See also Westerlund v. Croaff, (Ariz.), 198 P. (2d)
842, 844, also cited by appellant.
In the second place, appellant is in error in her premise
that she was not permanently deprived of the custody of
the children by the Juvenile Court decree.
It will be noted here that .appellant has interpolated
into the statute the words "permanently" and "absolutely,"
neither of which appears therein.
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We think it a fair assumption, however, that the legislature, in creating the provision of the statute involved,
intended that it should apply only in the case where there
has been a permanent deprivation of custody as distinguished from a temporary deprivation and to that extent we go
along with appellant's argument. However, we maintain,
and hope to establish without question herein, that the decree of the Juvenile Court did permanently deprive the
appellant of the custody of the children and was a deprivation to which the above-quoted portion of the statute
was intended by the legislature to apply and to which it
does, in fact, apply.
The word "permanent" has a well-known obvious meaning, and is in contradistinction to the word "temporary,"
and is so used in legal enactments as well as contracts, such
as insurance policies. Wetherall v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc. of U. S., 263 N. W. 745. It is not equivalent to "perpetual" or "unending" or "lifelong" or "unchangeable."
Soule v. Soule, 87 P. 205. It does not include the idea of
"absolute." Coleman v. Bennett, 69 S. W. 734. However,
the word "absolute" has been defined to mean unconditional,
complete and perfect in itself without relation to or dependence upon other things or persons. Ketch v. Smith, 268
P. 715, 717. The wqrd "permanent" does not mean forever,
or existing forever. West'ern Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania
Co., 129 F. 849, 867. Ordinances which endure until repealed are deemed to be permanent. City of ElDorado v.
Citizens' Light & Power Co., 250 S. W. 882.
"Permanently," as used in the call of the rector of a
church, that he be and is elected permanently to the rector-
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ship of such church, means an indefinite period. The term
"permanently" as used does not mean that the parties were
to be bound together by ties to be dissolved only by mutual
consent, or for sufficient legal or ecclesiastical reasons. It
was intended that he should continue to hold the place only
until one or the other of the contracting parties should desire to terminate the connection. Perry v. Wheeler, 75 Ky.
641, 648.
Where plaintiff was employed at a certain rate per
year, with the statement by the employer that he wanted
plaintiff to come with the intention of staying permanently,
the word "permanently" would be regarded as meaning
nothing more than that plaintiff was to hold his position
until one or the other of the contracting parties should desire to terminate the connection. Minter v. Tootle-Campbell
Dry Goods Co., 173 S. W. 4, 6.
A person is "permanently" employed when he is hired
for an indefinite period terminable at will. Beaman v. E.
N. Rowell Co., 258 N. Y. S. 138, 140; Skagerberg v. Blandin
Paper Co., 266 N. W. 872, 873.
Measured by the above definitions it is clear that the
judgment of the Juvenile Court permanently deprived the
appellant of the custody of the children. The judgment of
deprivation was "unconditional, complete and perfect in
itself without relation to or dependence on other things or
persons," Ketch v. Smith, supra. It would continue indefinitely until someone made a move under the appropriate
statutes to terminate it or modify it in some particular and
it was not temporary or limited in time.
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Let us examine the decree of the Juvenile Court. That
decree declared and adjudged the children to be dependent,
neglected children within the meaning of the laws of Utah,
declared that the natural parents (of whom the appellant
was the mother) were unfit and improper persons to have
the care, custody, control and guardianship of them and
then decreed that they (the parents) "be and they are
hereby deprived of the custody of said children." Nothing
further was provided in the decree concerning the custody
of these children insofar as either parent was concerned.
Their rights to custody were effectively and permanently
severed by the provisions quoted. Nowhere in the further
provisions of the decree are any rights whatever continued
or reserved in the parents or either of them. Whatever jurisdiction was retained by the court was not with respect to
the deprivation of custody from the parents but with respect to the commitment to the Utah State Department of
Public Welfare "for foster home care, treatment, and supervision." This retention was only to insure the placement
of the children in a home -or homes where they would be
properly treated and cared for. And here again, we repeat
that the appellees, at the time of filing the adoption petitions, had the custody of the children by virtue of that decree. It is true that liability for certain payments for the
support and maintenance of the children was imposed upon
the father, but that liability neither conferred nor continued
any rights in him and is not a factor in determining whether
there was a permanent deprivation of custody, as there
may be a permanent deprivation of custody and yet a continuing obligation to support the child. Cf. In re Olson,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28

supra. However, this liability was not imposed upon appellant and even though she may have made three payments toward the children's support, these payments were
purely voluntary and not by virtue of any obligation imposed upon her by the decree, by statute, or otherwise and
neither created nor continued any rights to the children in
her.
This being the clear import, it would seem to be manifest without further argument that the decree permanently
deprived both parents of the custody of the children. We
shall, however, _proceed further to show that this is the
inescapable result.
A comparison of the decree in these cases with that of
the Juvenile Court in Jensen v. Sevy, supra, clearly shows·
the difference between a decree permanently depriving a
parent of custody and one that is interlocutory and in effect
continues some interest in the parent to the child. The order
in that case vacated all previous orders and provided: "That
the Court retains jurisdiction of this matter * * * and
in the event said petitioner, Fern Jensen, deports himself
becomingly between the date hereof and June 1, 1942, then
and in that event said petitioner, Fern Jensen, shall have
and enjoy the sole custody of said minor child." Under this
order the court, unlike the court in the instant cases, retained jurisdiction "of this matter," and placed certain
rights in the father "in the event" he deported himself
becomingly. In the instant case the Juvenile Court did not
retain jurisdiction "of this matter," made no reference to
future custody but committed the children to the Welfare
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Department for foster home care, "subject to the continuing
jurisdiction of the Court."
In further confirmation of our premise that the decree
permanently deprived the natural parents of the custody
of the children let us next examine several of the cases
cited and quoted from at length in appellant's brief. These
cases are cited in subdivision I, subsection C of th~ brief
(Br. 21-29) in support of the contention that written consent for adoption is required from the natural mother, but
we submit that if they stand for anything pertinent to the
instant cases, they indisputably confirm that which we
have above maintained-that consent of the natural mother
in these cases is not necessary to the adoptions because the
decree of the Juvenile Court permanently deprived the
natural parents of the custody of the children, continuing
no rights whatever to the children in either of them.
The cases of Jackson v. Spellman, (Nev.) 28 P. (2d)
125, Smith v. Smith, (Idaho) 180 P. (2d) 853, Onsrud v.
Lehman, (N. Mex.) 243 P. (2d) 600, and Ronck v. Ronck,
(Okla.) 218 P. (2d) 902, all deal with cases of divorce
where the custody of a child is awarded to the party securing the divorce on account of cruelty, desertion, neglect,
etc., with the right of visitation with the child reserved in
or granted to the offending spouse. The decisions hold that
in such cases the consent of the latter is a necessary prerequisite to entering of a decree of adoption. The rationale
of these cases is as stated in Jackson v. Spellman, supra,
"that where a divorce is granted for cruelty [or desertion
or neglect] and the innocent spouse is awarded the custody
of the children, consent of the guilty spouse can only be
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dispensed with in a proceeding for adoption of such children
when the custody is awarded to the innocent party without
reserving any rights whatever in the guilty spouse. The
custody must be absolute" (emphasis supplied).
In other words, if a divorce decree is granted on the
grounds of cruelty, desertion or neglect to a spouse who is
granted the custody of the children, without the right of
visitation or other similar right reserved to or granted the
offending spouse, the consent of the latter is not a necessary
prerequisite to the entering of a decree of adoption.
If we examine the decree of the Juvenile Court in the
cases at Bar and measure it by the principle set forth in the
cases immediately above considered, it becomes readily apparent that that decree, likewise, is one upon which Section
78-30-4, supra, is intended to and does operate.

In the first place the phrase "subject to the continuing
jurisdiction of the Court" added nothing to the decree that
was not already implicit in the decree by virtue of the
statutes above set forth, which specifically provide that
the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court shall continue. The
continuing jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court is precisely
parellel with the continuing jurisdiction of the District
Court in divorce matters as provided by Section 30-3-5
U. C. A., supra, and in each case the parties can invoke the
processes of either court to modify its decrees, regardless
of whether the decree reserves that right or not. Consequently, if appellant's argument were followed to its logical
conclusions, there could be no decree in the Juvenile Court
or in divorce proceedings in the District Court to which
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Section 78-30-.t,., supra, could apply. A divorce decree, particularly as to custody of children, is always subject to
modification upon a showing of changed circumstances, regardless of whether one spouse is awarded the custody of
children without any reservation of rights in the other
spouse or not, and the same is true of a decree of the
Juvenile Court, the statute in the latter case providing for
the reopening of a decree the same as Section 30-3-5 U. C. A.
supra, provides for the reopening of a divorce decree.
We think the court in the case of Ronck v. Ranck,
supra, aptly summed up the applicable rule involved as
follows ( pp. 904-905) :
"The statute recognizes that the consent of both
parents, even though divorced, is necessary to an
adoption, unless the divorce was granted upon the
ground of cruelty of which the offending parent had
been adjudged guilty. It follows that it is not the
divorcement but the adjudication of cruelty that is
made the basis of rendering the consent unnecessary. It is the unfitness of the one so adjudged
guilty and the absence, by reason thereof, of that
parental fitness necessary in determining the child's
welfare that his or her consent is not required along
with that of the unoffending parent. It does not
follow, however, that the fact of unfitness so found
is one that necessarily continues or that the court is
precluded by such adjudication from inquiring therein further where it is in the interest of the child to
do so."
May we revert to Jackson v. Spellman, supra, and to
that part of the opinion reading as follows :
"More precisely, we are of the opinion that
where a divorce is granted for cruelty and the in-
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nocent spouse is a warded the custody of the chilren (as in this case), consent of the guilty spouse
can only be dispensed with in a proceeding for adoption of such children when the custody is awarded
to the innocent party without reserving any rights
whatever in the guilty spouse. The custody must
be absolute" (emphasis supplied).
In the light of this rule it is crystal clear that the decree of the Juvenile Court reserved no rights whatever to
custody of the children in the natural parents-they were
completely and absolutely deprived of any custody whatever. We invite the Court's attention to the fact that the
decree is in two parts, each complete in and of itself. In
the first part the natural parents were completely and
absolutely deprived of custody and if the words "subject
to the continuing jurisdiction of the Court" have the significance attached to them by appellant, we think it is of utmost significance that these words do not appear in that
part of the decree depriving the parents of custody, but in
the following provision committing the children to the
Welfare Department . The decree is as complete and\absolute with respect to the deprivation of custody and the
reasons therefor as it is possible to make it.
Further considering appellant's contentions regarding the decree, let us paraphrase it and assume that, instead of providing as it does, the decree provided as follows:
"It is adjudged and decreed by the Court that Rhea Walker
Deveraux, one of the parents of said children, be and she
is hereby deprived of the cus~ody of said children. It is
further ordered by the Court that said children be and they

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33
are hereby declared and adjudged to be dependent, neglected children within the meaning of the laws of Utah, in such
cases made and provided, and that subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the Court~ the care, custody and control
of said children be awarded to Ellis Deveraux, the father
of said children." Surely, under such a decree if the cases
cited by counsel and above considered have any application
whatever to the situation herein (which admittedly they
do), they squarely hold that under such circumstances it
would be unnecessary to obtain the natural's mother's consent to an adoption. Is there any real difference between
the situation in the hypothetical case and in the instant
cases? We submit there is not.
We repeat that under the authorities above cited the
decree of the Juvenile Court permanently deprived the
natural parents of the custody of the children: Consequently, under the clear and certain language of Section 78-30-4
U. C. A., supra, these children may be adopted without the
consent of the natural parents.
POINT III.
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DECREED THESE ADOPTIONS WITHOUT THE
CONSENT OF THE NATURAL MOTHER BY
VIRTUE OF HER HAVING BEEN JUDICIALLY DEPRIVED OF THEIR CUSTODY BY THE
JUVENILE COURT.
We have shown that the natural parents were judicially
deprived of the custody of the children involved in these
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adoptions and that within the clear and certain language of
Sectiou 78-30-4 U. C. A. no consent was necessary from
them in the adoption proceedings.
The rule supporting this conclusion, and universally
recognized, we believe without exception, is stated in 1 Am.
J ur. p. 642, par. 41, as follows:
"The right of a parent with respect to his child
is not an absolute paramount proprietary right or
interest in or to the custody of the infant, but is in
the natur~ of a trust reposed in him, which imposes
upon him the reciprocal obligation to maintain, care
for, and protect the infant, and the law secures him
in this right so long as he shall discharge the correlative duties and obligations, and no longer. The
state may provide for forfeiture of the parent's
natural rights and for the adoption of a child, without the consent of the parents, where, in accordance
with such statutory provision, circumstances of misconduct exist which so warrant. And where the
custody of a child has been taken from the parents
for delinquency by adversary proceedings, their consent to its adoption is no longer necessary." Cf.
Nugent v. Powell, (\Vyo.), 33 P. 23, 28.
This principle has even been extended to dispense with
the necessity for notice of hearing to the parents under such
circumstances, and is aptly explained in 1 Am. Jur. pp. 645646, as follows :
"The only exception to the general rule that the
rights of the parent, however much 'he may be at
fault, cannot be cut off without notice to him and an
opportunity to be heard in his own behalf exists in
the presence of statutes providing for the divesting
of the parent's natural rights in an adversary pro-
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ceeding for that purpose, or of which it is an incident. Thus, it will be obs2rved that the exception
is apparent rather than real, inasmuch as the parent has, previous to the adoption proceeding, had
his day in court and a full determination of his parental rights, so that there is no longer need of their
protection at the time of the adoption. Where the
custody of a child has been taken from the parents
for delinquency, by adversary proceedings, notice
of adoption proceedings is unnecessary, since the
parents have already been divested of the custody
and control of the child."
See annotation 24 A. L. R. 427. Cf. In re Smith's
Estate, (Cal.) 195 P. (2d) 842, 848-849.

Weste,rlund v. Croaff, supra, also cited in appellant's
Brief, is to the same effect. In that case a writ of prohibition was granted on behalf of the father of a minor daughter, who had become divorced from the mother, prohibiting
the superior court from proceeding in an adoption matter
in which the mother and her husband were attempting to
adopt the child under the claim that the father had wilfully
deserted and neglected to provide for the child for one year
prior to the filing of the petition. The father appeared in
opposition to the petition, showed that he had not given his.
consent to the adoption and denied that he had deserted or
neglected his daughter. The lower court found that he had
not deserted and neglected the child and thereupon attempted to proceed to determine the question of whether or not
it would be for the welfare of the child and her best interests
~hat the adoption should be made. In this proceeding the
wurt apparently relied upon a provision of an old statute
which provided that "an adoption may be decreed without
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the consent of the parent, guardian, next of kin or ~ext
friend where the interests of the child will be promoted
thereby." The court found that this provision had been
omitted in the revision of the law by the legislature, that
there was no authority to grant an adoption on the basis
of "best interests" alone, thus making it mandatory that
the natural parent consent to the adoption unless the parent
was insane, imprisoned or had been guilty of wilful desertion or neglect. The court said ( p. 845) :
"None of these statutory equivalents of consent
is present in the instant case. There is no contention that the relator is insane or imprisoned, and
the court expressly found that he was not guilty
of wilful desertion or neglect to provide for the
child."
The rationale of this decision clearly is that if any of
the statutory equivalents mentioned in the above quotation
had been present, as is the case in the instant proceedings,
the court could and would have decreed the adoption without the consent of the father.
In the instant cases the statutory equivalent of consent
is the decree of the Juvenile Court depriving the natural
parents of custody, on account of neglect.
Appellant argues however, that if the court can, by
any justification, hold that the consent of the natural
mother was not necessary, the District Court still did not
have jurisdiction to grant the adoption without obtaining
the consent and approval of the Juvenile Court (Br. 28).
If this be a question of lack of jurisdiction of .the District
Court because of the Juvenile Court having exclusive jur·
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isdiction, as argued under Point I A of appellant's brief,
certainly the consent of the Juvenile Court wourd not confer jurisdiction. If however, it is a question of the right
to proceed and proof, it is immaterial under Section 78-30-J,.
U. C. A. whether the consent of the Juvenile Court is obtained or not. Section 55-10-30 (5) U. C. A., infra, permits
the Juvenile Court in the cases of neglect to dispose of the
child "in any other way, [with certain exceptions not material] that may in the discretion and judgment of the
court under all circumstances be for the best interest of
the child * * * ." In view of these provisions the method
provided by Sections 55-10-40 and 55-10-43 U. C. A. is not
exclusive, but is merely one of the ways that adoptions may
be effected. This method has no bearing whatsoever in,the
instant proceedings and of course can have no effect upon
the jurisdiction of the court below.

POINT IV.
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS REQUIRED TO
CONSIDER AND MAKE FINDINGS AS TO
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN.
As the heading of Point II of appellant's brief (p.
29) it is stated that "the welfare of a child is not the paramount issue as to whether the court has jurisdiction or
authority to permit an adoption."
We have no quarrel with this statement but have difficulty understanding its place in appellant's brief. At no
time have these appellees contended that in determining
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the jurisdiction or authority of the court below to decree
the adoptions the welfare of the children was the paramount issue or any issue. This Court however, has held,
as quoted in appellant's brief (p. 33), in In re Adoption of
D - - -, (Utah) 252 P. (2d) 223, that "nevertheless, when
questions of child custody arise, the welfare of the child
and her chances for a suitable home environment and advantages in nurture, training and education to the end that
she may live and be conditioned for a well adjusted happy
and useful life are important factors to consider. In fact, it
is often stated that such considerations are of paramount importance. However, this is modified by the presumption1
that the welfare of the child will best be subserved by being
in the custody of its natural parent."
If, as is stated in appellant's brief (pp. 29-30) "the
District Court in these matters clearly indicates by its findings of fact and conclusions of law in each case that it was
upon its finding that it would be to the best interests of
the children that they be adopted * * * that it entered
its decrees of adoption," this was precisely what it was re1
"Presumptions," as said in Machowik v. Kansas City etc. R.
Co., (Mo.) 94 S. W. 256, 262, "may be looked on as the bats of the
law, flitting in the twilight, but disappearing in the sunshine of actual
facts." In Peters v. Lohr, (S. D.) 124 N. W. 853, 855, this wellrecognized principle is aptly stated as follows: "the presumption,
where the opposite party has produced prima facie evidence, has spent
its force and served its purpose, and the party then, in whose fav~r
the presumption operated must meet his opponent's prima facie
evidence, and not presumptions." "A presumption is not evidence of a
fact, but purely a conclusion." As we shall point out later in this
brief the evidence is not only overwhelming but in fact uncontroverted,
and the fact so found by the court below on such evidence, that the
physical, emotional and moral health and stability of the said children, their security and best interests will best be promoted by the·
adoptions and that the mental and physical health of the children
would be endangered and it would be a psychological risk and detrimental to their physical, emotional, and moral health and stability
to return them to the appellant.
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quired to do. The court, however, did not find or conclude,
as set forth in the omitted portion of this quotation above
and as inferred by the entire statement, that it would be to
the best interests of the children "that the natural mother
be deprived of her own children." It was unnecessary to so
find or conclude because this was already an accomplisped
fact brought about by the decree of the Juvenile Court
which under Jensen v. Sevy, supra, was binding on the
District Court.
We do contend, however, that under the provisions of
Section 78-30-9 U. C. A., infra, the District Court was required to inquire into facts concerning the best interests
of the children and, having found and concluded to its satisfaction that the best interests of the children would be
promoted thereby, it was mandatory that the court decree
the adoptions.
Appellant remarks that nowhere in the findings,
conclusions or decree is it f)etermined that the natural
mother was not a fit and proper person to have the care,
custody and control of the children. Here again, it was unnecessary for the court to make any finding in this regard
because it had before it the decree of the Juvenile Court
establishing that fact. Moreover, nowhere under the statutes relating to adoption is the District Court required to
make such a finding. Its right to proceed without consent
of the parents is premised upon t~e Juvenile Court having
so found and having consequently deprived the natural parents of custody. Try as she will, the appellant connot get
around the decree of the Juvenile Court-that decree stands
as to her fitness as well as to the deprivation of custody.
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We have no quarrel with the decisions in Howes v.
Cohen, (Cal.) 255 P. (2d) 761; In re Schwab's Adoption,
(Pa.) 50 Atl. (2d) 504; In re adoption of D - - -, supra,
cited and quoted from at length in appellant's brief (pp.
80-85) or with the principles therein established. But these
decisions, to the extent quoted, only reiterate the general
rule, as stated by appellant, "that the natural parents have
a paramount right to their children if they are fit and proper persons to have such custody" (emphasis supplied). In
the instant cases we have a competent and binding judicial
determination by the Juvenile Court, that has never been set
aside, that the natural mother is an unfit and improper person to have the custody of said children, and furthermore
what is more important under the statute, a judicial deprivation of custody, which as we have heretofore shown, is
the statutory equivalent of consent.

POINT V.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
ADMIT IN EVIDENCE THE FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE
AND JUDGMENT OF THE JUVENILE COURT
DATED FEBRUARY 13, 1953, IN THE MATTER OF LARRY AND BLAINE DEVERAUX.
The decree of February 13, 1953, grew out of proceedings relating to Larry and Blaine Deveraux and was in
nowise related to the two children involved in the instant
causes. Consequently, it could have no materiality or binding effect in these causes, and under no rule of law cited
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by appellant or stretch of the imagination can the decree
in those proceedings, in any respect, become res judicata
and binding upon the District Court in the instant cases.
While we might prolong this brief by endless citations, we
believe it to be so elementary that the rule of res judicata
cannot apply as between the decree in that proceeding and
the instant proceedings, if for no other reason than that the
parties are not the same, that no further citation is needed.
Appellant states (Br. 36) that "the Juvenile Court is
a court of competent jurisdiction in connection with the
care, custody and control of the minor children and its
findings and decree as to the fitness of their mother, unless
appealed from, become res judicata and binding upon the .
District Court." If the words "res judicata and" were
eliminated from this statement and if the "findings and decree" referred to were in relation to a proceeding involving
the two children who are the subjects of these adoption proceedings and not to two other children, we would be inclined
to agree with it. Furthermore, if such were the case the
District Court could not have decreed the adoptions herein.
But certainly no rule of law, at least none cited by appellant, or with which we are familiar, would permit the interposition of a decree in a wholly different matter to effect
or influence such a result.
If this appellant had included the two children involved
herein in her petition before the Juvenile Court for return
of custody and had obtained from that court the decree
which was entered but which would also have included
Diane and Gene, then it would seem that the appellees would
have no basis upon which to premise adoptions and the Dis-
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trict Court could not so decree 2 • This would seem to be the
crux of these proceedings and the statement of appellant
above quoted would appear to be a tacit admission of the
basic error of her position herein and the correctness of
the appellees'.
It is interesting to note that while counsel argues that
the District Court erred in not admitting the findings of
fact, conclusions of law and decree entered in a case not
relating to the two children involved in the instant proceedings, be quite strenuously objected to the admission of any
part of the files of the Juvenile Court relating to Diane
and Gene other than the decree, and was sustained by the
court (Tr. 36-37). Certainly if the findings and conclusions
made in the very case involving the subject children were
inadmissible, then a fortiori findings and conclusions entered in a case not involving the subject children would be
clearly inadmissible.

We submit that the District Court did not err in refusing to admit the findings of fact, conclusions of law and
judgment of the Juvenile Court in the proceedings involving
only Larry and Blaine Deveraux.
~-2-We point out, however, that the Juvenile Court only found that
the appellant's present conduct "appears" to qualify her to"ass~me
the custodv of those children and only returned them to her subJect
to the continuing jurisdiction" of that court.
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POINT VI.
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO ADMIT IN EVIDENCE THE WRITTEN
REPORT OF THE TOOELE COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENT.
Appe~lant

complains of the refusal of the District
Court to admit the written report of the Tooele County
Department of Public Welfare on the ground that this evidence was material to show that appellant had changed her
way of life and was a fit and proper person to have custody
of her children.
We submit, however, that the court very properly rejected this exhibit. This is a report made by an individual
to Judge Alder in connection with the proceedings to restore the custody of Larry and Blaine to their natural parents-it does not purport to be the report of the State Department of Public Welfare relating to the two children
the subject of these adoptions, which report is required in
adoption cases. Furthermore, no issue was, or could be,
before the District Court as to whether appellant had
changed her way of life and was a fit and proper person
to have the custody of Diane and Gene, the two children involved. The decree of the Juvenile Court to the contrary,
insofar as it applies to Diane and Gene, was at that time
in full force and effect and binding on the District Co~rt.
Consequently, there could be no issue on this question before the District Court and no error in its refusal to admit
an exhibit offered for such purpose.
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As a matter of fact, if any error was made by the
court in its refusal, it was harmless because the person
who made the report was before the court as a witness (Tr.
106-111) and testified substantially to the same effect as
the report, and it must be assumed that the court took these
matters into consideration and weighed them in nevertheless finding as a fact that the interests of the children will
best be promoted by the adoptions.

POINT VII.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Appellant complains that the court erred in entering
its findings of fact "2", and particularly that portion "and
permanently depriving the aforesaid natural parents of
said child."
We have heretofore pointed out under Point II that
the decree of the Juvenile Court did permanently deprive
the natural parents of the custody of the children within the
clear and certain language of Section 78-30-4. U. C. A.,
supra, as well as its intent. Therefore, that finding was
properly made by the court.
Appellant also complains about findings "10" and "11"
which are the same in both cases. She complains, not on
the grounds that they are not supported by the evidence,
but on the ground that such findings completely ignore
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the presumptions that it will be to the best interests of a
child to be with its natural parents if they are fit and
proper persons. They take no issue with findings "6" and
"7", which we shall set out in full and refer to later herein, and from which, as inescapable facts, findings "10"
and· "11" naturally flow, aside from the fact that specific
evidence thereon was received by the court from several
witnesses, as pointed out in our statement of facts herein.
We submit that these findings are abundantly supported by the record and are inescapable and that the conclusions of law "1", "2" and "3" complained of by appellant
naturally and logically flow from such findings and are
compelled thereby.
We have also elsewhere in this brief demonstrated that
it was not error on the part of the court to fail to make a
finding as to the fitness of the natural mother to have
custody of the children. This was not an issue before the
court.
3
The effect of this presumption has been elsewhere argued at
length in this brief and must necessarily be considered to have been
completely and thoroughly overcome by the evidence which resulted in
the findings complained of. Suffice it to say that there is an abundance of evidence in the record on the part of the appellees to support
these findings and there is no evidence to the contrary on the part of
the appellant that the children would be better off in her home--as
pointed out by this court in In re Olson, supra - or in fact
that she even loves them, or otherwise. She has not shown any
reasons for uprooting the children from the environments and homes
in which they now reside as a result of her cruel neglect and to which
they have now become attached and in which they have the love, affection and care of devoted parents-something neither of them apparently ever had before coming to the appellees.
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POINT VIII.
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN
REQUIRE THEIR ADOPTIONS BY THE APPELLEES.
We have not heretofore considered the contentions of
appellant with respect to the rule of strict construction of
adoption statutes. We now point out however that, as
.stated in 011srud v. Lehman, supra, quoted from by appellant, "the tendency of the courts is away from the narrow
and technical construction of adoption statutes appearing
in some of the earlier cases." This tendency and its approval
are considered and adopted by this Court, in the recent
case of In re adoption of D - - -, a minor, supra, in which
the Court stated as follows:
"Nevertheless when questions of child custody
arise, the welfare of the child and her chances for a
suitable home environment and advantages in nurture, training and education to the end that she may
live and be conditioned for a well adjusted, happy and
useful life are important factors to consider. In fact,
it is often stated that such considerations are of the
paramount importance. However, this is modified by
the presumption that the welfare of the child will
best be subserved by being in the custody of its
natural parent. In the case of Walton v. Coffman,
Mr. Justice Wade analyzes the antecedent cases of
this court regarding contests over children and
cogently sets forth this principle, but recognizes
that the right of the natural parent may be surrendered or lost. When a parent has failed to give the
child the attention and love normally to be expected,
has abandoned its care to others, and by irresponsi-
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ble conduct shown an unwillingness or inability to
measure up to parental responsibilities, these matters may be taken into consideration by the court in
connection with other factors in determining the
right to custody.
"Fourth : Public policy favors the adoption of
children who are left without parental refuge. Once
a child has been cast adrift and is without responsible parental care, the policy of the law should be to
assist in every way in establishing a satisfactory
parent-child and family relationship. Adoptive parents should not be discouraged by a construction of
the law which would cause them to fear the consequences of accepting a child because of the knowledge that the fate of their efforts would be at the
will of the natural parent. As Mr. Justice Miller
states:
"'It is apparent that if in particular cases
the unstable whims and fancies of natural mothers were permitted, first to put in motion all
the flow of parental love and expenditure of
time, energy and money which is involved in
adoption, and then, as casually, put the whole
process in reverse, the major purpose of the
statute would be largely defeated'."

This court also in In re Olson, supra, in approving Ex
parte Day, (Wash.) 65 P. (2d) 1049, held (p. 215) : "That
in determining whether children should be taken from the
home of friends of the highest character who were willing
and able to care for them and placed in the custody of the
father, the court would not take into consideration the
relative degree of comfort or luxury which might surround
them, but would consider 'Where the child would receive the
greater degree of affection and discriminating care which
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tt1ould tmd to best fit them to take their places in the active
affairs of life" (emphasis supplied).
The District Court made certain findings, which we
have heretofore pointed out have not been challenged by the
appellant and which are, in the case of Diane, as follows:
"6. That because of her neglect by her natural
parents, at the time the said child was placed with
petitioners, she was very nervous run-down and
sickly ; she was suffering from rickets, her legs being misshapen ; she had difficulty walking and
would frequently step on her own toes; she had dull
and stringy hair; she was undernourished and thin;
she had a frightened look about her and seemed to
have a pronounced feeling of insecurity and appeared to be frightened of people and was in need of
special care and attention.
"7. That since entering petitioners' home she
has been given special care and attention, and because of their love, devotion and special care of
her, her general condition has become normal, although she is still somewhat underweight; she is
now well adjusted in her social relationships with
children and adults and has confidence in and love
and appreciation for other people. She has the love
and devotion of the petitioners and of their families
and reciprocates the same" (Tr. 18).
And in the case of Gene, as follows:
"6. That because of his neglect by his natural
parents, at the time the said child was placed with
petitioners he needed special care and attention; he
was very nervous, suffered with enuresis, was insecure, rundown and sickly, his teeth were in bad condition and he was poorly adjusted in his social rela-
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tionships with children and adults, used profanity
frequently, displayed violent temper tantrums and
exhibited cruel tendencies toward other children ; he
seemed to be suspicious of everyone, showed no respect for the rights or property of others and exhibited no love or appreciation toward others.
"7. That since entering petitioners' home he
has been given special care and attention, and because of their love, devotion and special care of
him, his general condition has become normal, he
is now well adjusted in his social relationships with
children and adults, he no longer uses profanity, displays violent temper tantrums or exhibits cruel
tendencies toward other children and now has respect for the rights and property of others and has
confidence in and love, respect, and appreciation for
other people. He has the love and devotion of the
petitioners and their other children and reciprocates the same" (Tr. 16-17).
Could any court, faced with these facts and in the
absence of proof by the appellant that they would be better
off with her, reasonably or in good conscience conclude
otherwise than the best interests of the children require
their adoption by the appellees? The children are each now
properly adjusted in their present environment, subject to
wholesome influences; they are happy and love, and are
loved by, their adoptive parents and their families. They
now neither recognize nor know their natural mother nor
their two other brothers, and to tear them from their loved
ones now would, as found by the court, be a psychological
risk and detrimental to their physical, emotional and moral
health and stability.
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The final paragraph in the argument in appellant's
brief poses some significant questions. We shall answer
them in their converse order.
We, too, cannot see why notice should be given the
natural mother, in view of the deprivation of custody by
the Juvenile Court. We have pointed out under Point III
of this brief, with citations of authority, that notice is
not necessary under the circumstances herein and quote
from 1 Am. Jur. pp. 645-646 to that effect. Appellees first
proceeded on that basis and secured orders of adoption and
we believe the orders were valid but, after appellant filed
habeas corpus proceedings and in order to obviate any
question of validity of the orders and to eliminate a multiplicity of actions, the cases were reset upon notice to the
appellant, the orders of adoption were vacated and trial
had herein resulting in the decrees of adoption now under
attack by appellant.
Notice was not given or required so that the appellant
might present to the court her fitness for the care, custody
and control of the children. This could not be an issue so
long as the decree of the Juvenile Court remained unchanged.
Notice of the adoption proceedings were not given to
the natural mother purely for the purpose of protesting
that the adopting parents were not proper or that it would
not be for the best interests of the children to be adopted
by them, although we feel that the court might hear her in
these matters as well as it might hear any other person
in these particulars to the end that the court would not
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permit the adoptions against the best interests of the
children and to improper persons. The notice to the natural
mother, if required in such cases as these, is merely to give
her an opportunity to show whether consent is necessary.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion we respectfully submit that the decision
and judgment of the District Court is correct and should
be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
S. E. BLACKHAM,
Attorney for Appellees
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STATUTES INVOLVED
The pertinent provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
are as follows:
30-3-5. Disposition of property and children.
-When a decree of divorce is made the court may
make such orders in relation to the children, property and parties, and the maintenance of the parties
and children, as may be equitable; provided, that if
any of the children have attained the ag~ of ten
years and are of sound mind, such children shall
have the privilege of selecting the parent to which
they will attach themselves. Such subsequent changes
or new orders may be made by the court with respect to the disposal of the children or the distribution of property as shall be reasonable and proper.

55-10-5. Jurisdiction of juvenile courts.-The
juvenile court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases relating to the neglect, dependency
and delinquency of children who are under eighteen
years of age, except in felony cases as hereinafter
provided, and the custody, detention, guardianship of
the person, trial and care of such neglected, dependent and delinquent children, and the employment of
children as provided by law; and shall also have
jurisdiction over adult persons for all misdemeanors
committed by them relating to the custody, abuse,
detention, guardianship, employment, probation,
neglect, dependency, delinquency and care of children who are under eighteen years of age as is now
or may be provided for by law.
( 1) In any case in which the court shall find,
a child neglected, dependent or delinquent it may, in
the same or in any subsequent proceedings, upon the
parents of such child being duly summoned or voluntarily appearing as hereinafter provided, proceed
to inquire into the ability of such parents to support
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the child or contribute thereto, or into the fitness of
such parents to continue in the custody and control
of such child. The court may enter such order or decree as shall be according to law andjor equity in
the premises, and may enforce the same in any way
in which a court of law or equity may enforce its
orders or decrees.

*

*

*

*

*

(3) When jurisdiction shall have been acquired by the court in the case of any child, such
child shall continue for the purposes of such case
under the jurisdiction of the court until he becomes
twenty-one years of age, unless discharged prior
thereto or unless he is committed to the state industrial school or to the district court as hereinafter
provided.
( 4) Nothing herein contained shall deprive
other courts of the right to determine the custody
of children upon writs of habeas corpus, or when
such custody is incidental to the determination of
causes in such courts. Such other courts may, however, decline to pass upon questions of custody and
may certify the same to the juvenile court for hearing and determination or recommendation.

*

*

*

*

*

55-10-30. Judgment in cases of delinquency,
dependency or neglect.-At the conclusion of any
hearing the court may dismiss the case, or may
render a decree and judgment that the child is delinquent, dependent, neglected or otherwise within
the provisions of this chapter. If the juvenile is adjudged delinquent, dependent, neglected or otherwise
within the provisions of this chapter, the court shall
enter in writing the facts constituting such delinquency, dependency, neglect or other offense and
may further adjudge and decree as follows:
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( 1) That the child be placed on probation or
under supervision in his own home, or in the custody
of a relative or other fit person, upon such terms
as the court shall determine ;
(2) That the child be committed to the state
industrial school or to any suitable institution, children's aid society or other agency incorporated under
the laws of this state and authorized to care for
children or to place them in family homes, or to any
such institution or agency provided by the state or
a county;
(3) That the child be required to make restitution for damage or loss caused by his wrongful
acts;
( 4) That the child be placed under such guardianship or custody as may be warranted by the
evidence and for the best interest of the child; provided, however, that in the selection of a guardian
the court shall give due consideration to the preference of parents ;
(5) That the child be disposed of in any other
way, except to commit it to jail or prison, that may,
in the discretion and judgment of the court, under
all circumstaces be for the best interest of the child,
to the end that its wayward tendencies shall be corrected and the child be saved to useful citizenship.
55-10-31. Modification during minority.-In·
operative after majority.-No judgment or decree
of the juvenile court shall operate after the child
becomes twenty-one years of age and all orders,
judgments and decrees, except commitments to the
district court or to the state industrial school, may
be modified or revoked by the court at any time
.before the child becomes twenty-one years of age.
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78-30-4. Consent to adoption.-A legitimate
child cannot be adopted without the consent of its
parents, if living, nor an illegitimate child without
the consent of its mother, if living, except that consent is not necessary from a father or mother who
has been judicially deprived of the custody of the
child on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion; provided, that the district court may order the adoption
of any child, without notice to or consent in court
of the parent or parents thereof, whenever it shall
appear that the parent or parents whose consent
would otherwise be required have theretofore, in
writing, acknowledged before any officer authorized to take acknowledgments, released his or her or
their control or custody of such child to any agency
licensed to receive children for placement or adoption under chapter 8 of Title 55, and such agency
consents, in writing, to such adoption.
78-30-7. Jurisdiction of district court.-Adoption proceedings shall be commenced by filing in
duplicate a petition with the clerk of the district
court of the county where the person adopting resides, and the petition to adopt and all orders, decrees, agreements and notices in the proceedings
shall be filed in the office of the clerk of such court.
78-30-8. Procedure-Agreement of adopting
parents.-The person adopting a child and the child
adopted, and the other persons whose consent is necessary, must appear before the district court of the
county where the person adopting resides, and the
necessary consent must thereupon be signed and an
agreement be executed by the person adopting to
the effect that the child shall be adopted and treated
in all respects as his own lawful child.
78-30-9. Order of adoption.-The court must
examine all persons appearing before it pursuant to
the preceding provisions, each separately, and, if
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satisfied that the interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, it must make an order d~
claring that the child shall thenceforth be regarded
and treated in all respects as the child of the person
adopting.
78-30-14. Department of public welfareServed with petition-Duties-Report.-Upon the
filing of a petition for the adoption of a minor child,
if there is not filed therewith the written consent of
a licensed child-placing agency for such adoption, a
copy of such petition together with a statement containing the full names and permanent address of
the child and the petitioners shall be served by the
court receiving the petition within five days, on the
state department of public welfare of Utah, by reg.
istered mail, with return receipt requested, or personal service. It shall be the duty of the state department of public welfare, through its own field
agents, or through such other agencies and institutions licensed by the department for the care and
placement of children, or the probation officer of
the juvenile court or court of like jurisdiction of the
county, under the department's supervision, to verify the allegations of the petition, to make a thorough investigation of the matter and to report its
fin9ings in writing to the ·court within sixty days
from service thereof. The report shall show among
other things :
(1) Why the natural parents, if living, desire
to be relieved of the care, support, and guardianship
of such child :
(2) Whether the natural parents have abandoned such child or are morally unfit to have its
custody:
(3) Whether the proposed foster parent, or
parents, is or are financially able and morally fit to
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have the care, supervision, and training of such
child:
( 4) The physical and also the mental condition of such child insofar as this can be determined,
and any other facts and circumstances deemed advisable and necessary by said department to be investigated concerning said child and its welfare.
Upon the day so appointed the court shall proceed
to full hearing of the petition and the examination
of the parties in interest, under oath, with the right
of adjourning the hearing and examination from
time to time as the nature of the case may require.
If the report of the state department of public welfare, or its duly authorized agents, as provided herein, disapprove of the adoption of the child, the court
may dismiss the petition. No petition for adoption
shall be granted until the child shall have lived for
one year in the home of the adopting parents.
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